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DANBURY HATTERS IN SWEDEN:
AN AMERICAN VIEW OF EMPLOYER REMEDIES FOR ILLEGAL COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS1

César F. Rosado Marzán2
Margot Nikitas3

ABSTRACT
The European Court of Justice Laval quartet held that worker collective actions
that impacted freedom of services and establishment in the E.U. violated E.U.
law. After Laval, The Swedish Labor Court imposed exemplary or punitive
damages on labor unions for violating E.U. law. These cases have generated
critical discussions regarding not only the proper balance between markets and
workers’ freedom of association, but also what should be the proper remedies for
employers who suffer illegal actions by labor unions under E.U. law. While any
reforms to rebalance fundamental freedoms as a result of the Laval quartet will
have to be very sensitive to member state and E.U. institutions and practices, an
American perspective may prove useful to figure out the way forward. The United
States has a rich experience of court-imposed injunctions and punitive damages
which ultimately were deemed excessive by the public. It required very assertive
legislative and executive action to curb such excessive judicial incursions into the
workplace. To the extent the American experience is relevant to the EU, it will be
very likely that the E.U. will require political leadership and EU-wide labor law
and policy to rebalance markets and workers’ rights in the EU.
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I.

INTRODUCTION: AMERICANS, SWEDES AND PENDULAR SHIFTS IN
LABOUR LAW
Theoretically, laissez-faire or freedom of contract implied the freedom of workers to
withhold their labor either individually or jointly, if they so decided…. But in practice
such freedom conflicted with the institution of a self-regulating market, and in such a
conflict the self-regulating market was invariably accorded precedence. In other words, if
the needs of a self-regulating market proved incompatible with the demands of laissezfaire, the economic liberal turned against laissez-faire and preferred—as any anti-liberal
would have done –the so-called collectivist methods of regulation and restriction. 4

Laval5, Viking,6 Ruffert7 and Luxembourg8 (hereinafter referred to as the “Laval quartet”),
the freedom of services and establishment cases that have shaken the foundations of European
discussions regarding “social Europe” strongly resonate with the central of thesis of the
economic historian Karl Polanyi regarding the relationship between regulation and markets. The
imposition of exemplary damages (which approximate what American lawyers would call
punitive damages9) by the Swedish Labor Court against labor unions that resulted from Laval
continues to spread grave concern among labor advocates. These advocates argue that the EU
law is friendly to markets at the expense of workers.10 The EU cases all depict state-like actions11

4

KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF
OUR TIME 148 (2001 Beacon Press).
5
Laval un Partneri, Case C-341/05 (Dec.17, 2007).
6
Int’l Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ
Viking Line Eesti, Case C-438/05 (Dec. 11, 2007).
7
Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, Case C-346/06 (Apr. 8, 2008).
8
Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-319/06 (June 8, 2008).
9
Exemplary damages may resemble punitive damages in that neither corresponds to an actual
and proved economic loss. However, they may diverge in both the level of fault by the party
required to assign such damages and the amount of damages issued by the court, as described in
infra at note 39.
10
See for example the European Trade Union Congress’ call for a E.U. “social protocol,”
particularly after the Laval quartet. European Trade Union Congress, Social Progress Protocol /
ECJ rulings, available at http://www.etuc.org/r/846 (last visited in May 2, 2012).
11
We say “state-like” because the authors, like Phillipe Schmitter, agree that the E.U. is neither a
state nor a simple international organization, but a sui generis hybrid polity, a “non indentified
political object” (“objet politique nonidentifié”). PHILLIPE SCHMITTER, HOW TO DEMOCRATIZE
3

clamping down on working class collective action to protect the free movement of services and
freedom of establishment, cornerstones of an integrated EU market for goods and services.
The Laval quartet decisions resonate with Polanyi’s claim that elites create the selfregulating market through state action. Second it resonates with Polanyi’s claim that
interactions between atomized individuals maximizing self-interest are not the locus of real
markets. Therefore, and related to the first point, Polanyi argued that when workers acted
collectively to protect themselves against markets, the pro-free market ruling elites shifted gears
and imposed restrictions on the actions workers; they dropped their laisez-faire agenda and used
elite collective power and the state over workers. However, when markets are valued above
“society,” markets threaten society’s very fabric and require regulation. This is Karl Polanyi’s
famous “double movement” of deregulation followed by regulation.12
The Laval quartet in many ways follows this Polanyian trajectory: EU law, through its
“four freedoms”—free movement of goods,13 services,14 labor,15 and capital16—has created an
integrated market society in twenty-seven member states. In some cases, including those in the
Laval quartet, workers used their collective resources to challenge some of the excesses of the
market. The European Court of Justice, through its holdings, was mobilized by employers to

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WHY BOTHER? 2 (Rowman

and Littlefield Publishers 2000).
Moreover, as Perry Anderson has also argued, “The Union is no equivalent to either the United
States or Japan, since it is not a sovereign state. But what kind of formation is it? The Union
remains a more or less unfathomable mystery to all but a handful of those who, to their
bemusement, have recently become its citizens. Well-nigh entirely arcane to ordinary voters, a
film of mist obscures it even in the mirror of scholars.” PERRY ANDERSON, NEW OLD WORLD 3
(Verso 2009).
12
POLANYI, supra n. 4.
13
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010,
2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 (hereinafter “E.U. Treaty”) arts. 26 and 28.
14
Id. at arts. 26 and 76.
15
Id. at arts 26, 45, and 49.
16
Id. at arts. 26 and 63.
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curb such working class actions. Now, especially after the Swedish labor court issued exemplary
damages against the unions in Laval, Europe discusses how to better regulate labor relations and
deal with the potential excesses of market integration in the EU. We are seeing the double
movement unfold.
If history is to serve as a guide for future action, it is certainly true that the EU member
states have a rich history of their own in which to look for guidance for a new regulatory shift.
From Marx to Polanyi and the scores of others who have documented working class history and
its challenges, there are more than sufficient lessons to learn from accounts of European working
class history, market construction and regulation.
This article, however, will try to show the need to curb state coercion and particularly
punitive damages in the EU against labor union collective actions as part of the larger need to
rebalance the scales of power between capital and labor. With no intent to provide a complete
account—although with the sincere effort to provide an account that provides justice to the
facts—we recount a short, but well-known sliver of United States’ history with injunctions and
punitive damages in labor relations: the extension of antitrust law and damages into industrial
relations exemplified by the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Loewe v. Lawlor,17 commonly
referred to as the “Danbury Hatters” case, in which 250 union hatters faced punitive damage
penalties and confronted losing their homes and possible bankruptcy.18 An important sector of
the American capitalist class—proprietary capitalists—and its lawyers used the courts to attempt

17

208 U.S. 274 (1908).
The employers sought to attach the real estate and bank accounts of 250 Danbury Connecticut
union hatters, some of which were not actively involved in the union at all. Daniel R. Ernst, The
Danbury Hatters, in CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS AND ANDREW J. KING, LABOR LAW IN AMERICA
180, 181 (Johns Hopkins 1992).

18
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to all but destroy a hatters union, if not the entire American labor movement19 through the use of
antitrust law, injunctions and damages.20 While proprietary capitalists and their allies did not
ultimately triumph in destroying labor, they inflicted very real injuries to workers and their
organizations through the courts. The extreme, anti-labor ruling in the “Danbury Hatters” case
stirred national debates leading, in great part, to the birth of modern American labor law.
This chapter argues that from an American perspective, the exemplary (or what
Americans would call “punitive”) damages ordered by the Swedish Labor Court in Laval un
Partneri Ltd,21 seem excessive. Under American federal labor law, which in this article refers to
the National Labor Relations Act22 (“Act” or “NLRA”), punitive damages are not available.
Unions that commit illegal collective actions will be penalized under the NLRA, but the
remedies available to employers are normally limited to injunctions and compensatory damages.
Antitrust law may impose treble damage (a severe type of punitive damages) liability, but only in
extremely limited circumstances.
The U.S. courts did not always have this limited injunctive/compensatory remedy system.
For lack of a better term, and accepting the possibility of distorting the contours of American
labor law, which some say is rule-based and legalistic,23 we will refer to this limited injunctive
and compensatory remedy system as a “liberal” one. From the late 19th to mid-20th century,
U.S. courts frequently issued injunctions against strikes and even imposed punitive damages on
19

The employer and plaintiff if Loewe v. Lawlor, Dietrich Edward Loewe, formed with another
proprietary capitalist and hat maker, Charles H. Merritt, the American Anti-Boycott Association
to “resist boycotts by lawsuits and other legal measures—in effect, a pro-employer legal defense
fund.” Id. at 190 (internal citations omitted).
20
Daniel R. Ernst, supra note 18 at 182-184 (Johns Hopkins 1992)
21
Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others, Case No. A 268/04
(Dec. 12, 2009).
22
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
23
Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 NORTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW (2012).
6

workers and unions. Even when the U.S. Congress passed laws protecting workers’ concerted
activities and restricted injunctions and court-imposed damages on such actions, courts continued
to impose injunctions and punitive damages on workers by interpreting such statutory protections
very narrowly. It took not only assertive legislation but also executive action from the President
to curb the punitive, interventionist role of courts in labor markets and promote a more liberal
industrial labor relations system in the U.S.
Finally, to the extent U.S. history in any ways foreshadows EU policy regarding the
relationship between markets and labor—to the extent it may echo Polanyi’s pendulum’s shifts
between deregulation and regulation—the EU requires assertive political leadership to stop the
real possibility that coercive, anti-labor, court-imposed sanctions may grow from the seeds of the
Laval quartet. The Laval quartet discussions come at the heels of larger discussions of
democratizing the EU,24 determining its “social model”25 and expanding EU to all society, not
just the thin social layer that currently identifies with the project.26 Reining in the effects of
Laval is thus part of a larger debate in favor of a more democratic and “social” EU construction.

II.

FREE MARKETS THROUGH STATE COERCION: LAVAL
It is clear from the case-law of the Court that … freedom to provide services is one of the
fundamental principles of the Community …. In that regard, it must be pointed out that
the right to take collective action for the protection of the workers of the host State
against possible social dumping may constitute an overriding reason of public interest
within the meaning of the case‑law of the Court which, in principle, justifies a restriction
of one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty…. However, collective
action such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot be justified in the light of the
public interest objective…. 27

24

PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, HOW TO DEMOCRATIZE THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WHY BOTHER?
(Rowman and Littlefield 2000)
25
JONAS PONTUSSON, INEQUALITY AND PROSPERITY: SOCIAL EUROPE VS. LIBERAL AMERICA
(Cornell 2005).
26
NEIL FLIGSTEIN, EURO-CLASH: THE EU, EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND FUTURE OF EUROPE (Oxford
2008).
27
Laval un Partneri, Case C-341/05, ¶¶ 103, 110 (Dec.17, 2007).
7

The Labor Court finds that the stance of the European Court of Justice in these issues
entails in this case that there is a violation of [EU] law that is sufficiently clear. The
requisites for damage liability exist therewith.28

In the Laval case, the Swedish Labor Court ordered several Swedish labor unions to pay
punitive damages and attorneys’ fees to Laval, a Latvian construction company that had posted
workers in Sweden, after the unions struck to induce Laval to join an existing collective
bargaining agreement that bound all Swedish construction workers.29 Laval did not employ any
of the Swedish union members.30 Laval and its employees were already bound by a collective
bargaining agreement governed by Latvian law,31 but the Swedish unions wanted Laval to enter
into a collective bargaining agreement with them and pay Swedish-level wages.32 The collective
actions by the unions included a blockade of the employer’s worksite that precluded delivery of
goods, placing pickets and prohibiting Latvian workers from entering the worksite.33
Electricians and then other labor unions held sympathy strikes, boycotts and blockades.34 These
actions made work at the construction site impossible and eventually bankrupted Laval.35
Laval then filed suit against the Swedish Building Workers’ Union (Byggnads), its Local
Branch No. 1, and the Swedish Electrician’s Union. Laval petitioned the Swedish Labor Court
to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice (“EU Court”) before deciding
the case. The Swedish Labor Court then requested a preliminary ruling from the EU Court on
the legality of the industrial actions taken by the Swedish unions against Laval. The EU Court
28

Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others, Case No. A 268/04
* 23 (Dec. 12, 2009) (An unofficial translation by Jur. Dr Laura Carlson, on file with author).
29
Id. (Dec. 12, 2009).
30
Laval un Partneri, supra note 26 at ¶ 28.
31
Id.
32
Id. at ¶ 30.
33
Id. at ¶ 34.
34
Id. at ¶ 37-38.
35
Id. at ¶ 38.
8

determined that the Swedish labor unions’ strike against Laval was illegal as an unlawful
restriction on the freedom to provide services.36
After the EU Court issued its preliminary ruling that the strike was unlawful in Laval, the
Swedish Labor Court ordered the labor unions to pay exemplary damages and Laval’s attorneys’
fees.37 Although the Swedish Labor Court had determined that Article 49 of the Treaty of the
European Union (“EU Treaty”), which protects the free movement of services, had horizontal
direct effect between the parties (it bound private parties between each other), the question
remained as to whether the Swedish unions’ violation of Article 49 of the EU Treaty was
susceptible to a damage remedy. Laval asserted two grounds for its damage claims: (1) the labor
unions’ violation of the EU Treaty regulations as to freedom of movement; and (2) the industrial
actions were taken to displace a collective agreement under which the company was already
bound. The Swedish Labor Court found that the unions could be held liable for damages under
both theories.38
The Swedish Labor Court then addressed whether the labor unions were liable to pay
damages to Laval. Although the Swedish Labor Court found that Laval had clearly suffered
economic harm, it had failed to prove any damages. Therefore, the Swedish Labor Court denied
Laval’s claim for economic damages.39
However, the Swedish Labor Court ordered the Swedish unions to pay exemplary
damages, or what we may define in the U.S. as punitive damages. The Swedish Labor Court first
held that, contrary to the unions’ view, liability for punitive damages in cases of violations of EU

36

Id at ¶1-2; Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others, Case
No. A 268/04 * 3.
37
Id. at *44.
38
Id. at *23, 31-32.
39
Id. at *35.
9

law is not dependent on a finding of intent or negligence.40 The Swedish Labor Court noted that
exemplary damages were not unknown in Swedish labor law, and indeed were “somewhat
typical. . .and can be awarded in situations where industrial actions in the form, for example, of a
blockade, have been taken in conflict with the regulations of [Swedish law].”41 In addition, the
court stated that it had to consider the “principle of effectiveness,” which requires that EU law be
given functional effect in all the member states.42 This meant that “the requisites that are in place
for the right to damages may not be less favorable than those concerning similar national claims
for damages, nor be formulated so that it in practice becomes impossibly or unreasonably
difficult to receive damages.”43
With regard to the requirements of Swedish labor law, the Swedish Labor Court held that
reductions of exemplary damages—as the union requested here—were not applicable to
“conscious and/or flagrant cases.”44 Although the industrial actions were not illegal under
Swedish law, they clearly violated EU law. Even though the industrial actions had taken place
prior to any judicial decisions stating the illegality of their actions, the Swedish Labor Court
emphasized that the EU Court’s ruling had retroactive effect. It also declared that “[e]ven if the

40

Id. at *36. Certainly, a determination that punitive damages do not require a showing of intent
or negligence strikes an American lawyer as odd. For example, the American Black’s Law
Dictionary states that punitive damages require the liable party to have acted with “recklessness,
malice or deceit.” Therefore, the lower threshold for liability should give us a moment to pause
regarding the symmetry between punitive damages in the United States and exemplary damages
in Sweden. Perhaps they are not exact functional equivalents. However, the same dictionary
states that punitive damages are also termed “exemplary damages; vindictive damages; smart
money.” BRIAN GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 164 (New Pocket Edition 1996).
Understanding the exact functional role and equivalence of punitive or exemplary damages in
Sweden in the U.S. is therefore warranted, but is beyond the bounds of this article. It should be
explored in a future work.
41
Id. at *28.
42
Id. at *38.
43
Id.
44
Id.
10

state of the law was not established, there was reason according to the view of the Labor Court
for the Labor Unions to consider whether the industrial actions notwithstanding were consistent
with E.U. law.”45 The unions should have made those determinations before engaging in
industrial action especially because the Swedish Labor Court had consistently held that “high
demands must be placed on the labor market organizations when it comes [to] investigating, with
exactitude and care, whether a planned industrial action is not prevented by an eventual arising
duty to maintain the industrial peace.”46 In this case, the Swedish Labor Court found that this
view equally applied to potential impediments to industrial action arising from EU law.47 Thus,
the Swedish Labor Court ordered Byggnads and the Local Branch to each pay SEK 200,000 in
punitive damages,48 or approximately US $29,750,49 and the electrician union to pay SEK
150,000 in punitive damages,50 or approximately US $22,310.51 The Swedish Labor Court also
awarded Laval SEK 2,000,000 in attorneys’ fees,52 or approximately US $280,000 plus
interest.53
Certainly, the amounts issued as exemplary damages were not tremendous, particularly
for a strong national union such as Byggnads, which claims a membership of 100,000.54
However, what worries us is the manner in which the Swedish Labor Court established a
precedent for exerting its coercive authority over workers to protect and prioritize the free

45

Id. at * 39.
Id. at * 39.
47
Id.
48
Id. at *44.
49
Conversion done in March 27, 2012 using http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter.
50
Id. at * 44.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Conversion done in March 27, 2012 using http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter.
54
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, available at http://www.byggnads.se/Om-Byggnads/Omoss (last visited on May 4, 2012).
46
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movement of services in the EU when the unions were uncertain of the illegality of the act under
EU law; their actions were certainly legal and traditionally undertaken under Swedish law.
Polanyi’s pendulum swung toward the use of regulatory powers against workers and in favor of
the so-called market. Perhaps the exemplary damages were modest this time, but what could
happen next, if not in union-strong Sweden, elsewhere in the EU?
III.

THE AMERICAN “LIBERAL” MODEL
The NLRA defines what elsewhere may be termed “collective action” as “concerted

activity,” or activity performed by more than one statutorily defined employee. 55 An employee
acting alone can also engage in “concerted activity” when he or she performs such activity with
the intent of getting more employees involved,56 when others encourage the activity, or the
activity refers to rights contained in a collective bargaining agreement.57 Employees need not be
represented by a labor organization to perform protected, concerted actions.58
The NLRA generally protects employees’ concerted actions, which means that the
employer cannot discipline or terminate the employees, or otherwise take adverse action against
the employees, to the extent that such concerted actions are for “mutual aid and protection.”59
However, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), the federal agency charged with
administering the NLRA, considers some concerted actions performed in ways that are
disproportionately injurious to the employer as unprotected, either because the goals are

55

Phillips Petroleum, 339 NLRB 916 (2003).
Martin Marietta Corp., 293 NLRB 719 (1989).
57
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
58
NLRA § 7. Accord NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
59
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
56
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“reprehensible” or the means are “indefensible.”60 When concerted action is not protected
employers may terminate or otherwise discipline the employees.61
Strikes in the U.S. are not protected constitutionally, as they are in many other countries.
Moreover, as the U.S. has not ratified International Labor Organization (“ILO”) Conventions
8762 and 98,63 U.S. strikes are not shielded by those international instruments. However, strikes
are generally protected by Section 7 and particularly by Section 13 of the NLRA. The 1947 TaftHartley amendments64 to the NLRA define a strike as “any strike or other concerted stoppage of
work by employees (including stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective-bargaining
agreement) and any concerted interruption of operations by employees.”65 Employees who strike
retain their status as “employee.”66 However, employers in the United States have the unique
right to “permanently replace” striking workers during an economic strike.67 In the United States
we have two basic kinds of strikes: “unfair labor practice strikes”, or strikes undertaken by
employees in protest of employer actions that the NLRB determined were in violation of the
NLRA.68 Economic strikes are all other strikes, such as those, “in support of bargaining demands

60

ROBERT A. GORMAN AND MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 406 (2d ed. 2004).
61
Id. at 408.
62
ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
(1948).
63
ILO Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (1949).
64
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which amended the NLRA, is codified as the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”) 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq.
65
LMRA § 501(2), 29 U.S.C § 142(2).
66
NLRA § 2(3) and § 13. Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th
Cir. 1969).
67
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telelegraph, 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
68
GORMAN AND FINKIN, supra note 60 at 456.
13

regarding wages and working conditions or requests that the employer recognize the union.” 69
The employer may temporarily but not permanently replace employees engaged in an unfair
labor practice strike.70
The practice of permanently replacing striking employees can be destructive of unions,71
hence why it has been denounced by prominent international human rights organizations,
including Human Rights Watch, as a violation of internationally recognized rights of freedom of
association.72 The ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association, in its report regarding the U.S.
law and practice of permanently replacing economic strikers, stated that permanently replacing
strikers might be a violation of internationally recognized fundamental rights of freedom of
association.73 Nevertheless, permanent strike replacements continue to be the law of the land in
the U.S.
Moreover, primary strikes—or strikes against an employer with whom the union has a
dispute regarding its members’ terms and conditions of employment—are protected by the
NLRA. However, secondary activity is illegal. Secondary activity, “may be defined as the
application of economic pressure upon a person upon with whom the union has no dispute
regarding its own terms of employment in order to induce that person to cease doing business

69

Id.. Establishing whether a strike is an unfair labour practice is no easy task, it requires
“drawing nice factual inferences from an ambiguous record.” Id. For a fuller description of the
unfair labour practice and economic strikes see Id. at § 17.4.
70
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
71
KENNETH DAU SCHMIDT ET. AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE: CASES
AND MATERIALS 614 (West 2009).
72
LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (Human Rights Watch and
ILR/Cornell University Press 2000).
73
International Labour Organization, Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against
the Government of the United States presented by the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), ¶ 92, Report No. 278, Case No. 1543 (1991).
14

with another employer with whom the union does have such a dispute.”74 Specifically, section
8(b)(4) of the NLRA proscribes secondary activity and strikes pertaining to jurisdictional or work
assignment issues (relating to representation conflicts between unions). In addition, section
8(b)(7) regulates and restricts strikes aimed at compelling the employer to recognize a union,
where the employer has lawfully recognized another union and a question concerning
representation cannot be raised, a valid election has taken place within the preceding year, or the
union has begun picketing for more than thirty days without filing an election petition.75
Other important regulations regarding economic strikes include that the union must
provide the employer with sixty-day notice before striking.76 In the healthcare industry, the
“cooling-off period” requiring notice is extended to ninety days.77 However, unfair labor practice
strikes do not require a notice period.78 Finally, strikes deemed to involve a “national
emergency,” by imperiling national health and safety, 79 may be enjoined for eighty days.80
During that period the appropriate government players will fact-find and mediate the conflict in
an attempt to avert the strike.81
Remedies available to employers who are subject to 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) actions include
injunctions and damages. The NLRA requires the NLRB regional director handling the case to
74

GORMAN AND FINKIN, supra note 60 at 313.
NLRA § 8(b)(7).
76
NLRA § 8(d).
77
NLRA § 8(g).
78
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW VOL. II 1588 (John E. Higgins, Jr., ed., 5th ed. 2006)
(hereinafter “Developing Labor Law”) citing Park Inn Home for Adults, 293 NLRB 1082 (1989).
It is important to note that under federal labour laws covering federal employees, strikes are
restricted or entirely prohibited. For example, federal government employees are forbidden to
strike and violation of this prohibition amounts to a penal action. See 5 U.S.C § 7311; 5 U.S.C §
3333; DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra n. 23, at 1589. Strikes also cannot be used to commit the
crime of extortion. See 18 U.S.C § 1951; DEVELOPING LABOR LAW at 1589.
79
NLRA § 208 et seq.
80
GORMAN AND FINKIN, supra note 60 at 496.
81
LMRA §§ 201-210. See also DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra, at 1590, n. 92.
75
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file a complaint in federal court requesting a so-called 10(l) injunction when the regional director
has “reasonable cause” to believe that the union has committed violations pertaining to 8(b)(4)
and 8(b)(7) of the Act.82 Violations of the labor law that fall outside the bounds of sections
8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) may also be enjoined through section 10(j) of the Act.83 One difference
between 10(l) and 10(j) injunctions is that for 10(j) injunctions the regional director must, prior
to requesting the injunction, determine that an unfair labor occurred. Mere “reasonable cause”
that an unfair labor practice occurred will not suffice to request a court to order a 10(j)
injunction. Second, whereas the NLRB regional director must request 10(l) injunctions in
appropriate circumstances, the regional director has discretion whether to request 10(j)
injunctions. Finally, even though courts may grant 10(l) and 10(j) injunctions as they deem “just
and proper,” courts are generally more hesitant to provide 10(j) injunctive relief than 10(l)
relief.84
Under Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, compensatory damages may
also be available to employers harmed as a result of secondary activity.85 Moreover, the Sherman
Antitrust Act, the federal antitrust and anti-monopoly statute, provides for treble (punitive)
damages against unions under very narrowly defined situations when unions and employers or
third-party businesses purposefully and illegally “combine” to restrain trade.86 But again,
punitive damages are unavailable under federal labor law. They are deemed as inimical to the
very functioning of a labor union. As the Supreme Court of the United States held in 1979:
Just as unlimited access to the grievance process could undermine collective bargaining,
so too the threat of punitive damages could disrupt the responsible decision making
essential to peaceful labor relations. In order to protect against a future punitive award of
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unforeseeable magnitude, unions might feel compelled to process frivolous claims or
resist fair settlements. Indeed, even those unions confident that most juries would hold in
their favor could be deterred by the possibility of punitive damages from taking actions
clearly in the interest of union members. Absent clear congressional guidance, we decline
to inject such an element of uncertainty into union decisions regarding their
representative functions.87

For the U.S. Supreme Court, punitive damages may deter a labor union from performing
its fiduciary duties to represent workers. The labor laws proscribe them.

IV.

THE DIFFICULT PATH TO “LIBERAL” LABOR LAW IN THE U.S.
The combination charged falls within the class of restraints of trade aimed at
compelling third parties and strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of
trade except on conditions that the combination imposes…. [The workers] proceeded
to carry out their combination to restrain and destroy interstate trade and commerce
between plaintiffs and their customers in other states by employing the identical
means contrived for that purpose; and that, by reason of those acts, plaintiffs [the
employers] were damaged in their business and property in some $80,000.88
The Supreme Court particularly points out that although Congress was frequently
importuned to exempt farmers’ organizations and labor unions from its provisions,
these efforts all failed and the [Sherman] Act still remains, after nearly a quarter of a
century of trial, unmarred by amendment, in the language originally adopted. In
short, the court held that if the plaintiffs proved the conspiracy or combination as
alleged in the complaint, they were within the Anti-Trust Act and entitled to the
damages sustained by them.89

It is important to emphasize that the American liberal model of industrial relations emerged
only after a slow and painful history. The response of U.S. courts to workers’ collective actions
that disrupted employers’ business operations (and thus the flow of goods in commerce) was
initially based on common law theories of criminal and civil conspiracy.90 Actions such as
strikes, boycotts, and picketing were treated as unlawful conspiracies that restrained trade and
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inflicted irreparable harm on the employer.91 Antitrust law was also used against unions, serving
as a basis to request injunctive relief and damages, as will be detailed below.
A. Clamping Down on Collective Action Through Anti-Monopoly Law
Karl Marx once said that history tends to repeat itself first as tragedy, then as farce, but
the essential elements of the plot tend to persist. In Europe, current attempts to curb workers’
concerted action are diffusing through judicial interpretations of EU law that give primacy to the
freedom of movement of services and establishment in the EU. Common law theories of civil
and criminal and civil conspiracy were readily argued by employers and in many cases accepted
by courts to sanction union actions in the United States. However, in late 19th to early 20th
century U.S., state-sanctioned attempts to curb workers’ concerted action came through judicial
extension of federal antitrust statutes against unions, in favor of saving the market from “illegal
combinations,” whether of corporations or workers.
In 1890, the U.S. Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act.92 The Sherman Act makes
illegal “[e]very contract, combination...or conspiracy...in restraint of trade.”93 Penalties for
violation of the Sherman Act include injunction, criminal prosecution, and treble damage
awards. Although Congress had in mind the regulation of business corporations that combined
to control market supply and prices when it passed the Sherman Act, the Act was more often
applied to labor unions.94
B. The “Danbury Hatters”
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Arguably the most famous case applying the Sherman Act to unions was Loewe v.
Lawlor, also called the “Danbury Hatters” case.95 The employer-plaintiff owned a hat factory in
the state of Connecticut that derived the bulk of its profits through the sale of hats in interstate
commerce (or trade between the American states). The defendant union and its members were
the United Hatters of North America, which was part of the American Federation of Labor, and
promulgated a union hat label. After an extended organizing campaign by the United Hatters, the
employer’s factory was one of a few remaining non-union plants. The United Hatters then
engaged in a strike and secondary boycott to pressure the employers to recognize the union. The
complaint alleged that the union members intentionally and maliciously conspired to restrain the
employers’ trade in hats by intimidation and threats made to employers, their wholesalers, and
retail customers. The complaint further alleged that the union instituted a boycott against
wholesalers and retailers who sold the employers’ hats, and even against retailers who purchased
hats not made by those employers. The boycott was achieved through direct pressure,
distributing leaflets, and publicity in local newspapers and the union’s periodical. The employerplaintiff alleged US $80,000 in damages96, or over US $2 million in 2012 currency.97
On these facts, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the union actions violated the Sherman
Act and remanded the case for a determination on damages. The Court held that the union
violated the Act by unlawfully combining to restrain trade by “compelling third parties and
strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of trade except on conditions that the [union]
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impose[d].”98 Although the union’ true purpose in the boycott was not to obstruct interstate
commerce but to compel the employers to recognize the union, the “combination was
nonetheless deemed illegal under the Act because it had the effect of restraining trade. The Court
also noted that its prior case law and failed attempts to exempt “farmers and laborers” from the
Act’s prohibitions confirmed that the Act applied to labor organizations.99
When the remanded case100 again reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court affirmed a
treble-damage award of US $240,000 against the union, or about US $5.5 million in 2012
currency.101 Because 250 defendant union members could have lost their homes and bank
accounts, which were the plaintiff-employer attached in order to collect the damage award,102 the
American Federation of Labor prevailed on workers across the U.S. to donate one hour’s pay on
January 27, 1916.103 The donations, along with contributions from the United Hatters, paid the
damages.104
What was perhaps most paradoxical of the employer’s lawsuit in this case was that the
employer based his lawsuit on what legal historian Daniel Ernst calls “proprietary capitalism”
and “Victorian” culture, which extolled values of “independence, diligence, thrift and calculation
needed to thrive in a competitive market.”105 Yet, Loewe, the owner of the firm, permitted
practically un-blameworthy workers (who were nominal union members but who did not
participate in any way in the public life of the hatters union) to have their bank accounts and
98
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property attached by his lawyer.106 The law of agency, which imposed legal liability regardless
of an individual's actual role in a conspiracy, became the convenient statist tool to impose
liability and coercive pressure on workers.107
One of these workers whose property was attached, an Irish immigrant by the name of
William Humphries, while formally a union member,
[D]idn’t know the national officers … either by sight or name.” He rarely read the United
Hatters’ Journal. “I couldn’t see very good,” Humphries explained, “and hadn’t time to
do it.” As an honorary member of his local union since his fiftieth birthday, Humphries
was excused from appearing at its meeting and almost never attended them.” 108

Humphries further testified that, “I never was party to a conspiracy to interfere with Mr. Loewe
or anybody else.”109 In fact, Humphries personally knew Loewe and both men sat in the board
of directors of the local Danbury Hospital.110 During the trial, Humphries asked Loewe,
personally, why he had attached his home. Loewe replied, dismayed, that, “If I had the doing of
it, I wouldn’t have attached your property.” 111 The boss was sorry. But, in fact, he had no
choice. If he wanted to oppose the powerful union he needed strong tools from the state and legal
fictions to create blameworthy collectives. In a Polanyian manner, the laissez-faire capitalist had
to resort to collective strategies.112 As Ernst suggests, Loewe’s response to Humphries, then,
reveals his genuine confusion at finding himself locked in mortal struggle with a man who had
been no less faithful to the tenets of economic morality than Loewe had himself.”113
C. Towards a More Liberal Labor Law
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The “Danbury Hatters” led to national discussions regarding the need for legislative
changes that could protect workers from treble antitrust damages and other excessive
punishments, culminating in the passage of the Clayton Act of 1914. The Clayton Act explicitly
states that antitrust laws are not applicable to labor organizations,114 and no injunctive relief shall
issue against persons involved in a labor dispute.115 The labor movement hailed the Clayton Act
as its “Magna Carta.”116 But victory was declared too early. In 1921, in Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering,117 an obstinate U.S. Supreme Court determined, that the Clayton Act did not
shelter unions from liability for secondary boycotts, rendering the Act a nullity in light of the
“Danbury Hatters” case and the debates it generated.118
The courts were resilient to change, continuing a pattern of “government by injunction”
decried by Felix Frankfurter (who later became a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) and Nathan
Greene in their seminal work, the Labor Injunction.119 It was only after Congressional passage of
the Norris-La Guardia Act in 1932 and strong executive action during the New Deal that courts
began to diminish their use of coercion against workers engaged in concerted actions. In 1935,
the U.S. Congress passed the NLRA, which formulated comprehensive national labor policy for
the first time in U.S. history. President Franklin D. Roosevelt challenged the U.S. Supreme Court
with court packing in 1937 if the Court declared the Act unconstitutional.120 In NLRB v. Jones &
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Laughlin Steel Corp.,121 the Court held that the NLRA was constitutional and did not violate
rights of freedom to contract.
The ideological shift in the U.S. Supreme Court triggered “the change in time that saved
the nine” and started a new era for labor relations in the U.S.122 Labor jurisprudence took a
completely different turn. In 1940, the Court held in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader123 that treble
damages were not applicable against unions engaging in strikes that affected the shipping of
goods across state lines.124 In 1941, the Court went even further when it decided in U.S. v.
Hutcheson125 that the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act sheltered peaceful union
activity from injunctions, criminal prosecutions and treble, punitive damages under the antitrust
laws. The Court even acknowledged that the Clayton Act was a “disavowal by Congress of its
Duplex Printing decision”126 and, therefore, overruled Duplex Printing. Unions and employees
may still be liable under antitrust law when unions, “act as a conduit of price fixing conspiracy
among employers,” and when “employees and non-employees combine together to engage in
certain secondary activities.”127 However, for the most part, a new era of freer industrial labor
relations ensued on the American landscape. National labor policy protecting workers and
reducing coercive, state action against workers came to the fore.
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However, it should be noted that the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which amended the NLRA,
was unfavorable to labor in that it significantly relaxed the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s128 limitations
on the availability of injunctions in labor disputes. Furthermore, it amended the NLRA to, inter
alia, prohibit secondary boycotts; exclude supervisory employees from the law’s coverage; grant
employers free speech rights; and deny bargaining rights to unions with officers who were
Communist Party members.129 Although some scholars have argued that several of the TaftHartley amendments, such as that which made union coercion of employees an unfair labor
practice, were necessary to “equalize” the law, as a whole Taft-Hartley signaled a shift to the
right in U.S. labor policy.130 Yet, even these restrictive amendments to the NLRA did not reverse
the ideological move away from imposing treble antitrust damages on union activity.
V.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: SHIFTING THE PENDULUM BACK
The [EU] desperately needs to reconnect with its history. [Perry] Anderson [in his book,
The New Old World] shows it to us from the West, as an eastern suburb of America and
institutional laboratory of ultra-liberalism.131

The above citation from the French labor law scholar and public intellectual, Alain
Supiot, commenting on Perry Anderson’s book on the polemics of Europe132—although perhaps
extreme in its manifestation of the EU as an American “suburb” experimenting with “ultraliberalism”—is an important EU voice in the discussions regarding the EU’s difficulties to
cement a social model that contrasts starkly with the now exhausted Washington Consensus.
Certainly, the most important and immediately relevant lessons for the EU should come from the
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EU itself, since those experiences are, simply, much more meaningful—in the sense of being
understandable—for Europeans.
However, there are lessons that can be drawn from the American experience, especially
after both the American and EU experiences can be made meaningful through a Polanyian lens
of regulation in market economies. Our argument here is not so much that the Laval quartet
decisions and the Swedish Labor Court imposition of punitive damages are experiments in
American “ultra-liberalism,” or even that the EU cases share the same anti-worker intensity of
the “Danbury Hatters.” Rather, we argue that in the EU the pendulum shifted towards markets, as
it did in the U.S. in the “Danbury Hatters” case, and momentum for a more extreme market shift
may well be in motion in the EU today. How do we shift it back towards workers?
As we have argued here, the Laval-quartet, the Swedish Labor Court’s imposition of
punitive damages in Laval and the American “Danbury Hatters” case reveal a parallel tension
between collective labor rights and markets. In the “Danbury Hatters” and subsequent American
cases, the tension was between workers’ right to engage in industrial actions to better their
working conditions and alleged monopolistic practices, i.e., unlawfully combining in restraint of
trade. Because unions realized that employers could easily defeat unionization by closing and
reopening their plants union free, unions sought to increase pressure on employers by threatening
their goods at various points in the supply chain and by instituting boycotts and sympathy strikes
of other businesses that had some connection to the primary employer. However, by so doing,
unions were subject to injunctions and treble punitive damage liability under the Sherman Act
for unlawfully combining in restraint of trade.
It took a Congressional declaration of a national labor policy in both the NorrisLaGuardia Act and the NLRA and the President’s threat to pack the courts to reverse this trend.
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Under current U.S. law, employers may permanently replace striking employees engaged in an
economic strike and may terminate them if the strike is illegal and no other employer violations
are found. Employers may sue unions to obtain damages for violations of collective bargaining
agreements.133 Secondary boycotts remain unlawful. They are susceptible to compensatory
damage claims under section 303 of the LMRA and to injunctions under Section 10(l) of the
NLRA. However, employers can no longer request punitive damages from the courts. Only in
very narrow situations where unions and employers or third parties unlawfully conspire or
combine to restrain trade are treble punitive damages available to employers or, for that matter,
to anyone affected by an illegal combination in restraint of trade.
Across the Atlantic, in the EU, the Laval-quartet and the Swedish Labor Court’s
imposition of punitive damages showed a tension between the freedom to provide services and
the rights of workers in the host member state to maintain—and impose on the foreign service
provider—the wage levels and working conditions embodied in their collective bargaining
agreements. Since the Laval decision, one scholar has argued that “[u]nions must face the
dilemma of adjusting action taken to protect their members to the economic freedoms of the EU,
whenever there is a situation of potential social dumping.”134 In this context, social dumping
occurs where posted workers have inferior wages and working conditions than workers in the
host country.135 In the Laval-quartet and the Swedish Labor Court’s imposition of punitive
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damages, courts privileged the freedom to provide services over the fundamental right to strike
embodied in Articles 49 and 6(2) of the EU Treaty.
One can reasonably argue that the Swedish Labor Court went too far in awarding punitive
damages. After all, the E.U. Court had already determined that the Swedish unions’ strike was
unlawful. Employers could have sued for provable, compensatory damages. However, the
Swedish Labor Court awarded exemplary qua punitive damages, making a clear point that the
state would protect the EU market against workers. There are some resemblances here between
the Laval decisions and Loewe’s attachment of property of de facto non-liable workers to save
themselves against the workers’ collective actions.
We agree that the EU Court and Swedish Labor Court decisions are nowhere near
declaring the unions’ activity a combination illegal in itself, as did some U.S. courts under the
Sherman Act. Neither were the damage awards issued by the Swedish Labor Court comparable
to those affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the “Danbury Hatters” saga. However, the
regressive nature of the Swedish Labor Court in holding the unions liable for punitive damages
for engaging in collective action reflects a similar desire to protect market liberties and to punish
workers’ collective actions. A more anti-worker court at some other time and place may lead to
a scenario closer to that in the “Danbury Hatters.” This is the point of concern from an American
view.
This article continues the discussion on how to shift the pendulum back to workers.
There is no necessary reason why EU history needs to follow U.S. history or for EU reformers to
mimic past American strategies. It could well be the case that no national court in an EU
member state will ever issue injunctions a la Americana or punitive damages akin to those
awarded in the “Danbury Hatters” case when other unions violate EU law. Or it may just be the
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case that a well-crafted litigation strategy may change the way that the EU Court balances
workers’ rights with market freedoms. But American history suggests that assertive political
leadership may be necessary to rebalance the scales of power between capital and labor when the
courts protect “markets” over workers. The risk of reliving something like the “Danbury Hatters”
in Sweden or elsewhere in the EU is not unreasonable to fathom. After four EU Court decisions
and the traditionally worker protective Swedish Labor Court erring on the side of “markets,” a
coordinated political strategy for workers seems more than justified. Just as in the U.S.
injunctions and damages compelled the formulation of national labor policy and labor law,
perhaps it is time for a European labor policy and labor law. The entire drama befits a Polanyian
diagnosis and cure.
VI. EPILOGUE
As this article goes press, the European Commission has proposed a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC Concerning
the Posting of Workers in the Framework of The Provision of Services136 (hereinafter referred to
as the “Proposed Directive.”). It has also proposed a Council Regulation on the Exercise of the
Right to take Collective Action within the Context of The Freedom of Establishment and the
Freedom to Provide Services137 (hereinafter referred to as the “Proposed Regulation”). The
Proposed Directive and the Proposed Regulation (hereinafter referred to collectively as the
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“Proposals”) have been met by mixed reactions by EU politicians and the social partners; no
clear consensus has yet emerged regarding it.138
The Proposals in essence codify the basic policy tenets of the Laval quartet by giving
significant importance to freedom of movement of workers, services and establishment without
providing new or clear guidelines on how courts should balance such freedoms with freedom of
association rights. The Proposals acknowledge the fundamental but limited nature of freedom of
association 139 in a way that parallels that of the Laval quartet. In one of the Explanatory
Memoranda of the Proposals state,
[T]rade unions play an important role in this respect and should, as confirmed by the
Court of Justice, continue to be able to take action to protect workers’ rights, including
the possibility of calling their members out on strike and ordering boycotts or blockades
to protect the interests and rights of workers and ensure the protection of jobs or terms
and conditions of employment, provided this is done in compliance with European Union
and national law and practice.140

Parroting the Laval quartet’s policy reasoning’s and without clear guidelines on how to
balance the workers’ rights with the Treaty’s freedoms, the proposed regulation does not
qualify as the type of assertive political leadership that we have advocated for in this
chapter.
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Moreover, the regulation also legitimizes the imposition of nationally established
“fines and penalties”,141 which may reasonably include punitive damages, as in Laval du
partnieri. The Proposals open the door for the punitive damages that the Laval quartet
enabled. In our view, the Proposals do little to address our concerns established here.142
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